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ARTICLE 
PRIVATE CONSCIENCE, PUBLIC DUTIES: 
THE UNA VOIDABLE CONFLICTS FACING 
A CATHOLIC JUSTICE 
SCOTT C. IDLEMAN* 
I think that when statesmen forsake their own private conscience 
for the sake of their public duties . .. they lead their country by a 
short route to chaos. 1 
Most everyone is familiar with John F. Kennedy's remarks, when run-
ning for President in 1960, regarding the attenuated relationship between 
his governmental and religious obligations.2 
Whatever issue [said Kennedy] may come before me as President, 
if I should be elected-on birth control, divorce, censorship, gam-
bling, or any other subject-I will make my decision in accor-
dance with ... what my conscience tells me to be in the national 
interest, and without regard to outside religious pressure or dic-
tate. And no power or threat of punishment could cause me to 
decide otherwise.3 
Many are likewise familiar with former New York Governor Mario 
Cuomo's similar detachment of his governmental role and responsibilities 
from his potential duties as a faithful Catholic.4 
" Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. I would like to thank Professor 
Robert Vi scher for inviting me to the conference at which this article was to be. but ultimately was 
not, delivered. I would also like to thank the editors of the University of St. Thomas Law Journal 
for nevertheless including it in their publication of the conference proceedings. 
I. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS, act I (1960). Sir Thomas More was beatified 
by Pope Leo XIII in 1886 and designated the Patron Saint of Statesmen, Politicians. and Lawyers 
by Pope John Paul II in 2000. 
2. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy, Address to the Ministerial Association of Greater Houston 
(Sept. 12, 1960), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/usaJinfousaJfacts/democrac/66.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 18, 2006). For commentary, see Mark S. Massa, A Catholic for President? John F. 
Kennedy and the "Secular" Theology o.f the Houston Speech, 1960, 39 J. CHURCH & STATE 297 
(1997). A compilation of Kennedy's various comments on the matter can be found at http://www. 
adherents.com/peoplefpklJohn_F _Kennedy .htm!. 
3. Kennedy, supra note 2. 
4. See Mario M. Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor's Per-
spective, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 13 (1984). 
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The public may also have noticed that this position of detachment is 
not confined to the political branches, and that judges and judicial nominees 
have embraced or expressed it as well. For example, it has been the stan-
dard response of Catholic Supreme Court nominees when, during Senate 
confirmation hearings, they are questioned about the relationship between 
their faith and their jurisprudence.5 It has also been the response of judges, 
Catholic and other, who are asked to remove themselves from a case due to 
their religious beliefs or affiliation, or of the courts that have addressed such 
removal questions.6 
What the general public may not be familiar with, however, is the ex-
tent to which this detached posture is potentially at odds with Catholic 
church doctrine regarding the obligations of civil officials. 7 Indeed, nearly 
half a century after Kennedy's speech-or, for that matter, over two hun-
dred years after the nation's founding-an ecclesiastically acceptable 
means for resolving conflicts between religious and civil obligations has yet 
to be satisfactorily identified and implemented by the American bench. 
5. See Sanford Levinson, The Conji"Olltation (ll' Relifdous Faith and Civil Religion: 
Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047, 1049. 1062-65 (1990) (setting forth posi-
tions of then-Supreme Court nominees William Brennan, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy, 
each disavowing the influence of their Catholic faith upon their decision making, and concluding 
that "Justices identified with Catholicism have been forced to proclaim the practical mcaningless-
ness of that identification"). More recently, during their confirmation hearings. now-Chief Justice 
Rohcns and Justice Alito were similarly questioned about, and similarly disavowed, the influence 
of their Catholic faith on their judicial decision making. See Gregory A. Kalscheur, Conscience, 
the ConstitUlion, and the Role of the Catholic Judge, at 7-8, Lecture iIt Marquette University, 
:v1ilwaukee, Wis. (Aug. 30, 2006) (on file with authOr), available at http://www.jesuitswisprov. 
org/pdf/KalscheucPresentation_lext.pdL 
6. See, e.g .. Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Codispoti, 69 F.3d 399.400 (9th Cir. 1(95) 
(order of Noonan, J.); Singer v. Wadman. 745 F.2d 606, 608 (lOth Cif. 1984), cert. denied, 470 
U.S. 1028 (l985); State v. Frecman. 507 F. Supp. 706, 729-33 (D. Idaho 1981); Jake Gam & 
Lincoln C. Oliphant, Disqualification o{ Federal Judges under 28 U.S.c. § 455(a): Some Obser-
vations 0/1 lind Ob;ections to ({II Attempt by the United Srlltes Department o(Jusrice 10 Disqualify 
(/ Judf!,e on rhe Basis l!lHis Religion Gild Church Position, 4 HARV. J.L. & PL:B. POL'y 1,49-59 
(1981) (discllssing Freeman); John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney. Carholic Judges ill Capiral 
Cases, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 303, 346-48 (1998). In turn. "[Clourts have consistently held that 
membership in a church docs not create sufficient appearance of bias to require reeusa!." Bryce v. 
Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 1148, 660 (lOth Cif. 2002) (citing cases); 
Teresa S. Collett. "The King's Good ServaJII. Bur God's First": The Role of Relif!,ioll in Judici({1 
Decisiomnaking. 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1280-~86 (2000) (discussing several CHses). As one 
commentator notes, 
"[Rjellgious hackground alone should not be a proper basis for disqualification. Other-
wise. a Jewish judge, for instance. could not hear cases affecting Jewish interests, such 
m, the constitutionality of Sunday closing laws, nor could Catholic judges sit in cases 
aflecting Catholics as a group. A judge' s religious background, like his race or ethnic 
background, should not be presumed to affect his llbility to execute his judicial duties 
faithfully and impartially." 
Seth E. Bloom, Judicial Bias and Fin{/Ilcial Interest as Grounds fiJI' Disqualification ol F <,cleml 
Judges, 35 CASt: W. RES. L REV. 662, 686 (1985). 
7. See Kalseheur. supra note 5, al 9 (noling the U.S. "bishops' frustration with this son of 
separation of personal conscience from political policy"). 
314 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 4:2 
The argument advanced in this article essentially has three compo-
nents. First, it contends that the potential for such conflict will always exist 
and that trying to avoid it by either strategic ignorance or attempted detach-
ment is, from a number of perspectives, an inadequate avenue of resolution. 
Second, especially given a general lack of direct and authoritative church 
teaching on the matter, each judge is individually obligated, by exercising 
the prerogative of a well-formed conscience, to resolve the conflict as it 
may arise from case to case. In discharging this obligation, the judge should 
ideally reach an outcome-even if this occasionally means recusal-that is 
consistent both with the church's teachings and their natural implications, 
and with the professional responsibilities that attend the judicial role. Third, 
if the result is recusal or anything else out of the ordinary, and if court rules 
or customs so require, the judge should be willing to explain the basis for 
his or her decision, assuming that the judge also employs an appropriate 
level of prudence. 
In developing this argument, the article will proceed as follows. Part I 
will focus on the various sources of authority to which one might look to 
define a judge's religious obligations, including the obligation to affirma-
tively discern conflicts between the judge's church and civil duties. Part II 
will then address the empirical reality or probability that such conflicts oc-
cur, and, finding that they almost certainly do, will then assess the defensi-
bility of the detachment model. Upon determining that detachment is not an 
acceptable posture for judges, Part II will then describe how a judge might 
confront potential conflicts of obligation between church and state. 
Importantly, this article does not focus on the necessity, desirability, or 
defensibility of such detachment in a liberal democracy from the point of 
view of political theory, history, sociology, law, or any number of other 
disciplines. 8 Many have written ably on such matters,9 including these mat-
ters' specific application to Catholic judges 10 and their implications for the 
8. Nor does this article address the specific question of whether having a Catholic majority 
on the Supreme Court will or should lead to altered methodologies or outcomes. For one view, see 
Matthew J. Franck, The Unbearable Unimportance of the Catholic Moment in Supreme Court 
History, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'y 447 (2006) (reeognizing the historical signifi-
cance of having a Catholic majority, but arguing that it should not make, or should not have made, 
any difference to the confirmation process). A few scholars have examined the question of 
whether Catholic justices in the past have based their decisions in some way on their Catholicism. 
See, e.g., Phillip Thompson, Silent Protest: A Catholic Justice Dissent in Buck v. Bell, 43 CATH. 
LAw. 125 (2004). 
9. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PuBLIC REASONS 141-50 
(1995); MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS; CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES 
102-04 (1997); Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 932 
(1989); Wendell L. Griffen, The Case for Religious Values in Judicial Decisionmaking: A Nonna-
tive Perspective, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 513 (1998). 
10. See, e.g., James L. Buckley, The Catholic Public Servant, FIRST THINGS, Feb. 1992, at 
18; Garvey & Coney, supra note 6; William H. Pryor, Jr., The Religious Faith and Judicial Duty 
of an American Catholic Judge, 24 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 347, 355-58 (2006). 
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nomination and confirmation processes. j j The article's focus, instead, is 
whether the Catholic Church permits civil judges-including the new and 
unprecedented Catholic majority on the Supreme Court-to advocate or 
employ a posture of detachment when interpreting, applying, or fashioning 
the law.12 
1. POTENTIAL CHURCH DOCTRINE CONCERNING JUDICIAL OBLIGATIONS 
As interesting and important as this inquiry is, what one finds at the 
outset is that there are few if any authoritative church documents that speak 
directly to, or clearly about, a judge's specific obligations. Certainly 
"[t]here is no official church teaching that defines how Catholic judges 
should interpret the United States Constitution.'''3 Most often the church's 
focus is on legislators or on executive or administrative officials. 14 There 
are even statements on the duties of the ordinary citizen. '5 As for jUdging, 
II. D' Army Bailey, The Religious Commitments of Judicial Nominees, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PCB. POl'y 443 (2006); Francis J. Beckwith, Taking Theology SeriOllsly: The Status of 
the Religious Beliefs of Judicial Nominees for the Federal Bench, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PCB. POL'y 455 (2006). 
12. There is some scholarship addrcssing this question as it relates specifically to criminal 
punishmcnt. especially the death penalty. See Garvey & Coney, supra note 6; Michael R. Merz, 
Conscience of (/ Catholic Judge, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 305 (2004); Patrick 1. Smith, Note, A 
Method for the Madness: Restorative Justice as a Valid Mode of Punishment and an Advancement 
qf CaTholic Social Thought, 44 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 433 (2005). 
! 3. Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 12 (noting further that "[sJuch a question is beyond the com-
petcnce of the Church's teaching office"). 
14. See, e.g., Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae pI. 73 (Mar. 25, 1995) ("In the case of an 
intrinsically unjust law, such as a law permitting abortion or euthanasia, it is therefore never licit 
to obey it, or to 'take part in a propaganda campaign in favour of such a law, or vote for it.''') 
{quoting Congregation for thc Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration on Procured Abortion, No. 22: 
AAS 66, 744 (Nov. 18, 1974)), available at http://www.vatican.va!ho!y_father/john_pauUi/en-
cyclicals/documents/hfjp-iLenc_)5031995_evangelium-vitae_en.html: Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith, Prefatory Paragraph, Doctrinal Note 011 Some Questions Regarding the 
Participatioll of Catholics ill Political Life (Nov. 24, 2002) [hereinafter Doctrinal Note] (,This 
Notc is directed to the Bishops of the Catholic Church and, in a particular way, to Catholic politi-
cians and all lay members of the faithful called to participate in the political life of democratic 
societies."), available at http://www. vatican. vafroman_curiafeongregations/cfaithldocumen ts/rc_ 
concfaith_doc_20021124_politica_cnhtml. According to Professor Doug Kmiec, "[RJepeatedly 
and circumspectly, the Church's leaching is directed at 'elected officials' or those casting 'a legis-
lative vote.''' Catholic Judges, the U.S. ConsriTurion and Natural Law, Interview with Douglas 
Kmiec, YOUR CATHOLIC VOICE. Aug. 30, 2005, available at http://www.yourcatholicvoice.org/ 
insight.php'?anicle=2497. 
15. See, e.g., Doctrinal Note, supra note 14; see also U.S. Cont'. of Catholic Bishops, Faith-
ful Citizenship: A Carholic Call to Political ResponsibiliTy (2003), available at http://www.usccb. 
org/faithfulcitizcnship/faithfulcitizenship03.pdf; Archbishop Raymond L. Burke, On Our Civic 
ResponsibiliTy f(lr the Common Good (Oct. I, 2004), availahle at http://www.ewtn.comlIibrary/ 
bishopslburkccom.htmarchstl.org/commofticc/2004/letlers/l 0-0 1-04-civicresponsibi lity. pdf; Ste-
phen F. Torraco, A Britl' Catechism for Catholic Voters (2002), available at http://www.ewtn. 
com/votelbrieCcatechism.htm; CATHOLIC ALLIANCE, VOTING FOR THE COMMON GOOD: A PRACTI-
CAL GUIDE FOR CONSCIENTIOUS CATHOLICS (2006), availahle at http://thecathoiicalliance.org/ 
new Iti lesN oti ng -for-the-Common-Good.pdf. 
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however, one must extrapolate or engage in analogous reasoning in order to 
discern the appropriate significance of the church's moral teachings. 
This Part will engage in such an analysis, although it will do so in a 
tentative rather than a conclusive way. In my view, complicated analyses of 
church doctrine are best undertaken, and the resulting statements of lay ob-
ligations best promulgated, not by law professors, but rather by the episco-
pacy as a matter of authority or, in some cases, by faithful and trained 
theologians. The present objective, accordingly, is to identify the various 
authorities to which Catholic judges could refer when attempting to define 
their particular duties on the bench. These include church statements con-
cerning the obligations of other civil officers; statements from high-ranking 
or well-regarded church officials; the writings of other clergy as well as 
faithful, trained theologians; more general church doctrines that could be 
specifically applied to a judge's circumstances; and last, but obviously not 
least, whatever lessons one might draw from the life of Christ or from the 
early church, as long as one's interpretations do not contradict current 
church teachings. 
As noted, most of the authoritative church statements that address civic 
duties in regard to law or public policy appear largely focused on legisla-
tors, other elected politicians, and voters. According to a 2002 Doctrinal 
Note of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, then headed by 
Cardinal Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict XVI), "[A] well-formed Christian 
conscience does not permit one to vote for a political program or an individ-
ual law which contradicts the fundamental contents of faith and morals."16 
So, for example, "[T]hose who are directly involved in lawmaking bodies 
have a 'grave and clear obligation to oppose' any law that attacks human 
life. For them, as for every Catholic, it is impossible to promote such laws 
or to vote for them."17 Moreover, 
[In] the situation in which it is not possible to overturn or com-
pletely repeal [such] a law ... which is already in force or coming 
up for a vote, "[a]n elected official ... could licitly support pro-
posals aimed at limiting the harm done by such a law and at les-
sening its negative consequences at the level of general opinion 
and public morality."18 
If the judicial office and functions were just like that of the legislature, 
then the preceding language would seem to impose a significant limitation 
on judicial decision making, just as it currently does for legislating. But it is 
hardly clear that this language is aimed at judges. First, judges really do not 
"vote for," "promote," or have the ability to "repeal" laws, nor are they 
ordinarily considered "law-making bodies," though it is true that they pos-
16. Doctrinal Note, supra note 14, at pt. 4. 
17. ld. (quoting Evangelium Vitae, supra note 14, at pt. 73). 
18. /d. 
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sess the authority "to overturn" laws as long as doing so accords with ac-
cepted methodologies of their civil institutions, Second, the nature and 
obligations of judging, as Professor Gregory Kalscheur, SJ" recently noted, 
can be materially different from those of legislating,19 "While the role of 
the legislator is to shape policy in order to best promote the common good," 
notes Kalscheur, "the [primary] role of the judge is , , , to use the tools of 
legal analysis to interpret the Constitution and laws and to apply those laws 
as they exist in the context of deciding individual cases."20 Unlike legisla-
tors, in other words, "[i]t is not the role of the judge to reshape the law to 
conform to his or her personal convictions about what the law ought to 
be."21 Third and finally, judges, when compared to legislators, also face a 
different set of professional ethical obligations, such as impartiality, as well 
as a potentially different set of prudential considerations,22 
Collectively, these points of difference suggest that, while a judge's 
obligations under church doctrine, whatever they are determined to be, may 
ultimately bear similarities to the obligations of legislators, any such simi-
larities likely renect the coherence of church doctrine rather than a true 
likeness between the judicial and legislative offices, They also suggest that, 
in the end, the relevance and authoritativeness of judge-related rules-
based entirely on extrapolations from, or analogies to, the responsibilities of 
legislators-are potentially quite limited, 
Accepting this limitation does not end the inquiry, of course, but it 
does indicate that the inquiry's scope must be expanded, In turn, one can 
attempt to identify and assess papal statements, or statements by bishops' 
conferences, that may not carry the full weight of the church's teaching 
authority, but may be persuasive or otherwise instructive, For example, ac-
cording to a news report in 1949: 
Pope [Pius XII] listed four principles for a Catholic judge to fol-
low: 1) He "cannot shirk responsibility for his decisions and place 
the blame on the law and its authors. When he delivers a sentence 
in accordance with the law, the judge becomes an accessory to the 
fact and therefore is equally responsible for its results." 2) The 
judge "can never pass a sentence which would oblige those af-
fected by it to perform an intrinsically immoral act. . , ," 3) 
"Under no circumstances can a judge acknowledge and approve 
an unjust law, , . , Therefore he cannot pass a sentence that would 
be tantamount to approval of it." 4) "However . . . the judge 
19. See Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 9~1 L 
20. Id. at II (citing Avery Cardinal Dulles, Carholic Social Teaching and American Legal 
Practice, 30 FORDHA?I<l URB. LI. 277, 287~88 (2002)); Pryor, supra note 10, at 355~58). 
21. Kalscheur, supra nOle 5, at II. 
22. See SCOlt C. Idleman, The Limits of Religious Values in iudicial Decisionmaking, 81 
MARQ. L. REV. 537, 563~67 (1998). 
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may-sometimes even must-allow the unjust law to run its 
course, if this is the only way to avoid a greater evil."23 
The precise weight to accord these guidelines is not entirely clear. But 
absolute authoritativeness is hardly required in order to call into question 
the model of detachment, which they most certainly do. The guidelines, in 
fact, seem to impose limitations on judges quite similar to those imposed on 
legislators and, in so doing, indicate that neither legislators nor judges can 
avoid the actual and overall moral significance of their decisions, despite 
differences between their respective roles and responsibilities?4 
Another alternative in the absence of direct and binding church doc-
trines is to identify more basic or underlying church teachings, whether illu-
minated by the church itself or by the laity. One such teaching is the 
longstanding prohibitory doctrine of cooperation or complicity with evil,25 
which effectively precludes Catholics from ignoring or disassociating them-
selves from the full moral import of their conduct. By looking to this doc-
trine, for example, John Garvey and Amy Coney were aided in their 
analysis of whether, or to what extent, the judges can participate in the legal 
processes that culminate in capital punishment. 26 It is also a concern about 
which the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops has written with 
some force. "Those who formulate law," the Conference has said, "have an 
obligation in conscience to work toward correcting morally defective laws, 
lest they be gUilty of cooperating in evil and in sinning against the common 
good.'>27 Consistent with teachings and statements from the Vatican, how-
23. Which lAw?, TIME, Nov. 21, 1949, at I, available at http://www.time.com/time/maga-
zine/article/0,9171,856320.00.html. Another non-Magisterial monograph, authored by a Roman 
Catholic cleric and published just four years later. is JOHN D. DAVIS, THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF 
CATHOLIC CIVIL JUDGES (1953). 
24. Indeed, some have suggested that judges may have greater limitations. See. e.g., John J. 
Dilulio, Jr., The Catholic Voter: A Description with Recommendations, COMMONWEAL, Mar. 24, 
2006, at 10, available at 2006 WLNR 1638361 ("Arguably, democratically elected public officials 
have more, not fewer, legitimate reasons than life-tenure justices do to compromise their Catholic 
beliefs when deciding what positions to take on given issues."), available at http://www.common 
wealmagazine.org/article.php3?id_article=1565. 
25. See JAMES T. BRETZKE, A MORALLY COMPLEX WORLD: ENGAGING CONTEMPORARY 
MORAL THEOLOGY 223 (2004) (defining cooperation with evil, or cooperatio in malum, as a 
H[t]raditional term that is divided into two major categories, formal and material cooperation, plus 
a number of further specifications and distinctions. One can never cooperate 'formally' in the 
sense of sharing the same evil intent of another, but in the actual world we all at some time or 
another find ourselves in situations of 'material' cooperation, in which de facto our actions abel 
the commission of a morally bad action by another."). 
26. See Garvey & Coney, supra note 6. Then-Professor Garvey has since become the Dean 
of the Boston College Law School, and then-judicial derk Coney, now Amy Coney Barrett, has 
become a professor at the Notre Dame Law School. 
27. U.S. CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, CATHOLICS IN POLfflCAL LIFE (2004), available at 
http://www.usccb.orglbishops/catholicsinpoliticallife.shtml, 
2006] PRIVATE CONSCIENCE, PUBLiC DUTIES 319 
ever, the bishops' language in the first instance seems directed mostly at 
legislators.2H 
In turn, one can ask whether it is possible for a judge to hear and 
decide every matter set before him and not cooperate with eviL He could do 
this either formally, which means that the judge consciously harbors a bad 
intent while facilitating another's gravely immoral conduct, or material!.v 
but unacceptably, meaning the judge does not consciously harbor a bad 
intent, but nevertheless facilitates gravely immoral conduct by another and 
does so to a morally unacceptable extent or in a morally unacceptable way. 
On the surface, at least, it seems unlikely that this is in fact possible, al-
though there are many variables, such as the judge's jurisdictional scope or 
the overall morality of the legal system in which the judge functions, that 
can increase or decrease this apparent unlikelihood. 
[n addition to the prohibition on formal or unacceptable material coop-
eration with evil, the Catholic judge can also assess his decision making in 
light of the instructions and examples that Christ Himself provided by His 
life, death, and resurrection, including His own encounters with the judicial 
processes of His time. Speaking with regard to legal practice, for example, 
Professor John Breen noted the significance of the Christian realities of 
creation and especially the Incarnation: 
Because Christ was Himself a victim who wrongfully suffered at 
the hands of others, you should be able to find Him in those who 
are victimized today-the personal injury plaintiff who was crip-
pled by the negligence, greed, or indifference of another, the 
worker who was not hired because of the color of her skin, and 
the child who was abandoned, abused, or neglected by his 
parents .... 
But you must go beyond this .... You must find Him not only in 
the innocent client who is a sympathetic victim, but in the guilty 
person whom the state would condemn to death .... [I]ncivility, 
mistakes in judgment, and even criminal guilt cannot erase the 
dignity that every human person enjoys by virtue of God's love 
revealed in the wonder of the Incarnation. It will not always be 
easy to see the world in this way, but this is the demand of your 
faith, this is the call of your baptism.29 
As with lawyers, must a judge strive to perceive Christ in the attor-
neys, parties, witnesses, and jurors in his courtroom? In tum, might this 
28. See supra note 14 and text accompanying note 19 (addressing this point with regard to 
Vatican statements). While many readers, including many legal academics. would see no diffi-
culty including judges within the bishops' category of "[tJhose who formulate law," this is likely 
not the bishops' intent. They did not use words descriptive of the judicial function, such as "inter-
pret," or "apply" or even "enforce." Rather. they used the term "formulate," which most naturally 
refers to the legislative and perhaps executive process. 
29. John M. Breen, Baccalaureate Mass Retlection, The Catholic Lawver: Justice and the 
Incarnatio/l, 39 CATH. LAW. 269,274-75 (2000) (footnote omitted). 
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conceptual shift have a meaningful impact on the judge's perception of the 
case as a whole, or on particular functions such as assessing credibility or 
formulating and imposing remedies or sentences? These are complicated 
normative and empirical questions that cannot properly be answered in this 
article. Like the other inquiries addressed earlier, however, they certainly 
cal1 into question the tenability of the detachment thesis so often pro-
pounded by Catholic politicians, judges, and judicial nominees. 
II. THE CONFLICT: AN OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT 
Indeed, it is difficult to proceed through the analysis of Part I and con-
clude that, even considering their differences from legislators, Catholic 
judges do not have relevant mandates that arise from their faith, and that 
some of these mandates may conflict with the laws and processes that they 
are charged to apply. It is difficult to contend, for example, that a Catholic 
judge can truly be faithful when he authorizes a minor to have an abor-
tion,30 or, at least in some cases, when he hands down a sentence of death.31 
By the same token, it is hard to imagine that a Catholic judge in the early or 
mid-1800s seriously believed that he was following Christ while at the 
same time upholding, or not resisting, the legalized institution of slavery?2 
Even seemingly mundane decisions, such as evidentiary rulings or the 
enforcement of procedural rules, may present the possibility of such con-
flicts. For instance, a judge could arguably be defying his religious obliga-
tions to be charitable and to love his neighbor when he dismisses a suit in 
which a plaintiff, who has been genuinely and significantly injured by the 
defendant's conduct, loses entirely by procedural default. From the civil 
standpoint of due process, of course, there may be no violation whatsoever, 
and most trained lawyers and judges would likely feel only minor discom-
fort from such an outcome. From the standpoint of church teachings and in 
light of the example of Christ, however, judges are essentially asked not to 
measure the justness of their rulings simply by civil legal norms, but instead 
to ask whether they are fulfilling their roles as faithful Catholics in posi-
tions of social responsibility. 
30. See, e.g., Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 26-27 (arguing that a judge should, or at least 
should be allowed to, recuse himself in this situation given the proximity of the material coopera-
tion with evil); cf Larry Cunningham, Can a Catholic Lawyer Represent a Minor Seeking a 
Judicial Bypass for an Abortion? A Moral and Canon Law Analysis, 44 J. CATR. LEGAL STUD. 
379,405-06 (2005) (arguing that a Catholic lawyer would have to decline representation in such a 
case, given "the moral reality that he [would otherwise be] assisting a person to commit an act that 
the Church teaches as unequivocally immoral"). 
31. Compare Garvey & Coney, supra note 6 (identifying limitations on a Catholic judge's 
participation in capital cases), and Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 30-35 (largely agreeing with Gar-
vey and Coney), with Michael R. Merz, Conscience of a Catholic Judge, 29 U. DAYTON L. REv. 
305 (2004) (seemingly discerning no limitations). 
32. Cf Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (authored by C.J. Taney, the 
first Catholic Supreme Court justice), abrogated by U.S. CONST. amends. XIII & XIV. 
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Given these examples, both real and hypothetical, not only is the pro-
priety of the detachment model called into question, but so is its empirical 
defensibility. Even without reference to examples, it is counterintuitive to 
maintain that total judicial detachment from religious norms or obligations 
is either achievable as a practical matter or acceptable as a matter of church 
doctrine and teachings. Some level of conscious detachment can probably 
be achieved by at least some judges, but that is not how the notion of de-
tachment is presented by its self-identified adherents. Likewise, many or 
even most judicial decisions can probably be rendered without any defiance 
of church doctrine, but, again, that is often not how detachment is 
presented. Rather, judges or nominees who espouse detachment usually 
speak categorically, explaining that they can and will, without exception, 
follow the law and execute their legal duties regardless of what their relig-
ion might require or forbid in their private lives. 
There appears, then, to be at least a partial failure of the detachment 
modeL even on its own terms. This failure, in turn, makes it quite reasona-
ble to infer that many Catholic judges, at some point in their tenure, have in 
fact faced-or will in fact face-a conflict between their professional and 
their religious obligations. Unfortunately. many judges never reach the 
point of discerning these conflicts, much less the task of resolving them 
when they are identified, precisely because they have adopted a posture of 
detachment. They have already decided in advance that "conflicts" as such 
cannot arise, or if they do that they cannot be long-lived, because one's civil 
obligations are necessarily superior to one's religious obligations. No mat-
ter how it is recast or reconceptualized, this is, in essence, the foundational 
operative premise of the detachment model. It basically allows one to avoid 
recognizing conflicts in the first instance and, should that not succeed, ei-
ther to ignore them or to "resolve" them by automatically elevating the 
demands of the civil state above those of one's religious faith. 
The integrity of faith and intellect, however, demand that such con-
flicts, even if extremely infrequent, be neither avoided nor ignored. Church 
teachings become no less binding merely because one chooses not to see 
them or because one attempts to launder them through a secular theory of 
appropriate office-holding. Far from lessening one's duties, in fact, such 
omissions or commissions merely aggravate the gravity of one's noncom-
pliance. Even from a non-religious point of view, it becomes reasonable to 
question the honesty and integrity of a judge who can easily sidestep obli-
gations which in a different setting the judge might freely admit are of fun-
damental importance. 
The irony, perhaps, is that the church probably recognizes a greater 
degree of conscience-based discretionary decision making-particularly in 
areas of moral and technological complexity-than judges may think. As 
long as the church expressly or implicitly acknowledges room for legitimate 
disagreement and outcomes in relation to a particular subject, those exercis-
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ing well-fonned consciences may properly reach different outcomes with-
out jeopardizing their role as civil judges or their status as faithful 
Catholics. This approach, however, is not unconditional, which may very 
well explain why it is often rejected in favor of detachment. 
For one thing, a judge who attempts to walk this path can no longer 
dictate unilaterally the direction the path will take. The judge has acknowl-
edged a limited authority over the definition of his or her obligations to 
either the state or the church. In fact, the judge may periodically have to 
recuse himself or herself from particular cases, or, in the extreme scenario, 
may have to forfeit judicial office altogether. For another thing, the path of 
acknowledgement can be significantly more onerous than that of detach-
ment. Not only must the judge now affinnatively recognize conflicts when 
they emerge, the judge can no longer automatically resolve the conflict in 
favor of the civil government. Rather, the judge must undertake what may 
be a complicated assessment of his or her respective duties to church and 
state. 
Before examining how a judge might actually attempt to resolve such a 
conflict, it is important to reflect on or assess the significance of recogniz-
ing the conflict itself. Most importantly, it is arguably too simplistic to as-
sume that the existence of such conflicts is a negative or undesirable 
component of judging. History would suggest quite the opposite: judicial 
conflicts of conscience ought to be appreciated, not lamented. This is be-
cause, without judges who possess higher or external moral obligations, a 
nation or society sets the stage for greater injustice and tyranny. As noted 
by the character of Sir Thomas More in A Man for All Seasons, judges who 
lack these higher duties will "lead their country by a short route to chaos.'m 
This, in many respects, is the teaching of Ingo Muller's Hitler's Justice, 
which details the complicity of the bench in the political and moral viola-
tions of the Nazi regime.34 
Appreciating the conflict does not, of course, resolve it. From what 
source or in what forum, then, must its resolution arise? The Constitution 
certainly does not resolve it, and actually invites it by ensuring that "no 
religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or 
public Trust under the United States,"35 and that the government "shall 
33. A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS (Highland Films 1966). 
34. See INGO MULLER, Hrn.ER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH (Deborah Lucas 
Schneider trans., 1991); see also Stanley Kramer, JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG (United Artists 
1961) (film) (examining the criminal culpability of, among others, German judges). 
35. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3. Regarding the clause's relevance for the judiciary, see Francis J. 
Beckwith, The Court of Disbelief: The Constitution's Article VI Religious Test Prohibition and the 
Judiciary's Religious Motive Analysis, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 337 (2006); Gerard V. Bradley, 
The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine That Has 
Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674 (1987); ERWIN CHEMr~INSKY, JOHN ROBERTS AND 
THE EsTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE ROLE OF THE RELIGIOUS TEST CLAUSE IN THE CONFIRMA-
TION PROCESS (Aug. 2005), available at http://www.acslaw.org/filesJ2005%20programs_Chemer-
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make no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof."36 Under these provisions, a judicial nominee cannot (or at 
least should not) be denied confirmation solely because of his church affili-
ation or degree of devoutness. As for the church itself, it can only instruct 
the faithful; it cannot reverse or stay a judge's decision.37 It may deny cer-
tain sacraments to the wayward judge (except for the Sacrament of Recon-
ciliation), but the church lacks the jurisdiction to enforce its teachings and 
mandates in a civil courtroom. 
The necessary forum, then, must be the properly-formed conscience of 
the judge himself, whereby proper moral formation (I) contemplates mean-
ingful knowledge and appreciation of the church's authority and teachings, 
and (2) necessarily precludes active participation in or approval of conduct 
that "contradicts the fundamental contents of faith and morals."38 Under 
this approach, each judge in every case (and perhaps at multiple stages of 
the same case) must proactively determine whether a conflict exists. If one 
does, the judge must further assess whether the conflict is resolvable absent 
recusal or resignation, and, if not, to choose between these options.39 
Relevant authorities to which judges engaged in this analysis may look 
would obviously include the types of authority referenced in Part I of this 
article, such as the teachings or statements of the church or of the Pope, 
bishops' conferences, or even individual hishops or priests; the nature of 
Christ as recorded in the Gospels and as elaborated in other sources; the 
examples of St. Thomas More and other canonized or revered members of 
the church; the writings of professional and faithful theologians; and the 
insky_white%20paper.pdf; Daniel L. Dreisbach, The Constitution's Forgotten Religion Clause: 
Reflections on the Article VI Religious Test Ball, 38 1. CHURCH & ST. 261 (]996); Winslon E. 
Calvert, Note, Judicial Selection and the Religious Test Clause, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1129 (2004). 
36. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Establi,hment and Free Exercise Clauses appear, aL Lhe sLate 
level, to be as prohibitive of religious tests as the Religious Test Clause itself. See, e.g., McDaniel 
v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (invalidating a state constitutional provision prohibiting any member 
of the clergy from serving in the state legislature); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489 (1961) 
(invalidating a state constitutional provision requiring "a declaration of belief in the existence of 
God" as a qualification for public office); Silvennan v. Campbell, 486 S.E.2d I (S.c. 1997) (af-
tirming the invalidation of two state constitutional provisions requiring affirmation of the exis-
tence of a "Supreme Being" as a qualification for public oftice). More generally, the Court has 
declared that pursuant to the First Amendment the government may not "impose special disabili-
ties on the basis of religious views or religious status." Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
877 (1990). 
37. See Doctrinal Note, supra note ]4, at pC 6 ("By its interventions in this area, the 
Church's Ylagisterium does not wish to exercise political power or eliminate the freedom of opin-
ion of Catholics regarding contingent questions. Instead, it intends-as is its proper function-to 
instruct and illuminate the consciences of the faithful, particularly those involved in political life, 
so that their actions may always serve the integral promotion of the human person and the com-
mon good. The social doctrine of the Church is not an intrusion into the government of individual 
countries. It is a question of the lay Catholic's duty to be morally coherent, found within one's 
conscience, which is one and indivisible."). 
38. /d. at pt. 4 (referring to the limits of 3 legislator's well-formed conscience). 
39. See Kalscheur, supra note 5. 
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experiences of the judge's Christian contemporaries on or off the bench. 
Such an approach is obviously more demanding than either the fictional 
notion of detachment or the notion that Catholics simply ought not serve as 
judges. But it is demanding precisely because it requires the judge to exer-
cise both his faith and his reason-which is to say, the entirety of his con-
science in light of the church's teachings-and not succumb to simplistic or 
extreme models of judicial decision making that deny either the nature of 
reality or the obligations of morality. 
Once the judge has decided upon a resolution, there remains the ques-
tion of when, if ever, the judge is required to disclose the existence of the 
conflict and the resolution that the judge pursues. Generally speaking, it is 
not obvious that the church has anything specific to say about this question. 
Instead, this inquiry seems to be exactly the sort of matter that the judge 
himself or herself should resolve on largely prudential grounds, taking into 
account the necessity, efficacy, benefits, and potential adverse effects of 
making such a disc1osure.4o That said, a judge probably should make this 
sort of disclosure if the resolution of the conflict entails recusal or anything 
else out of the ordinary and if the civil court's rules or customs so require, 
at least to the extent that the judge's silence under such circumstances could 
do more harm than good to the public's and the parties' confidence in that 
judge and in the judicial system as a whole. 
III. CONCLUSION 
It is not always easy to be either a Catholic or a judge, and their com-
bination seems only to create additional and even more difficult problems. 
Today, the prevailing view, apparently, is that when a Catholic judge's re-
ligious obligations and judicial responsibilities collide, he should simply set 
the former aside in order to fulfill the latter. Such a view, however, is no 
less unpersuasive in the judicial context, and certainly no more persuasive, 
than it is in the legislative and executive contexts. It rests on a caricature of 
both judicial decision making and religious faith, and it does not fully ac-
cord with the actual obligations that the church arguably imposes on judges. 
A better and more honest approach would be to acknowledge the true na-
ture of these variables, to allow each judge to identify the actual conflicts of 
conscience that may be before him, and then to respect the judge's resolu-
tion of those conflicts if and when they arise. 
40. Regarding the interplay between judicial candor and prudence, though without particular 
regard for Church teachings, see Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 
TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1397 (1995). 
